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Events Force U.S. and U.S.S.R. To Reappraise Policies

As 1949 opens, bringing the twentieth century close to the halfway mark, there is little evidence of slackening in the "cold war," heritage of two grueling global struggles and a series of revolutions. Yet, nearly four years after V-E Day, there are signs of gradual economic stabilization in the United States, and of recovery in the war-devastated areas of Europe both west and east of Germany—although in Asia the tide of civil strife, with its accompanying economic and social dislocations, is still running high, and Latin America is experiencing an epidemic of military coups. Meanwhile, through the fog of ideological controversy some glimmers of comprehension begin to emerge concerning the great controversial issues our century has brought to a focus.

Dilemma of the East

This as yet very limited area of comprehension is due to the realization in many quarters that no one ideology, no one way of life, offers adequate answers to the widely varying problems of the world's many civilizations, unevenly developed in the course of human history, which today are seeking to operate on the single level of international organization. The inability to achieve a single pattern, such as prevailed in certain parts of the globe in the days of the Roman Empire, of feudalism, of the nineteenth century, creates dilemmas for both the East, symbolized by the U.S.S.R., and for the West, symbolized by the United States.

The dilemma of the U.S.S.R. is twofold. The Soviet government finds that it must, somehow or other, reconcile the

professedly international character of a world revolution posited on a clash of classes inside national states with the intense nationalism generated by the very movements which, in a given country, make it possible for Communists and their sympathizers to gain political power. It must also discover ways and means of providing, out of the war-shattered resources of its own still backward economy, the wherewithal to satisfy the aspirations for industrialization and a rising standard of living which not Communist propaganda alone, but also Russia's own experience of the past quarter of a century, have helped to arouse in other relatively undeveloped countries. At a point in history when the Soviet leaders may have hoped to be within reach of the goals once set by Lenin, they find their influence checked not so much by the United States but, paradoxical as this may seem, by the inability of the U.S.S.R. to fulfill the hopes pinned on Moscow by backward peoples.

If the West is to gain comprehension of the dilemma faced by the U.S.S.R., it is not sufficient to study the writings of Stalin, as is now being done by members of the American foreign service. It is also essential to examine the living commentary on Russian doctrines when exported abroad now being furnished by developments in Yugoslavia, where Marshal Tito, while continuing to support communism, rejects Russian domination and seeks to adapt Russian practices to the particular circumstances in his country; and of Poland where, without Yugoslavia's dramatic showdown, Polish lead-

ers, who consider themselves technically superior to the Russians, claim to have achieved economic successes greater than those registered by the U.S.S.R.

Exclusion of Western Thought

In this dilemma, the Soviet government has resorted to increasingly drastic measures of controlling all phases of intellectual life, from music to genetics, from economics to painting, in a double effort to demonstrate, with fierce nationalism, the superiority of all things Russian, and to exclude even the slightest degree of influence from the rest of the world—including, and this is seldom noted, the influence of Russia's more advanced neighbors, notably Poland. The Soviet government has also invoked economic sanctions to bring Yugoslavia in line, by cutting off essential exports not only of its own products such as cotton and other raw materials, but also food and manufactured goods from other countries of Eastern Europe; and Marshal Tito has charged that, after favoring the industrialization of Yugoslavia, the Kremlin now wants to keep it in the low status of a backward agrarian country. A more intensive campaign against the Catholic Church is also under way, notably in Hungary, where Cardinal Mindszenty was arrested on December 27 on charges which the United States denounced as a "rather sickening sham." Nor can the Soviet leaders, for the present at least, find much comfort in the prospect of a major depression in the United States which has continued to be anticipated by the Kremlin in spite of the contrary views expressed by a lead-

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ing Soviet economist, Eugene Varga.

That the tightening up of internal controls, especially over art, literature and science, has deeply disturbed the young generation of Russians has already been noted here.* Whether or not there is a difference of opinion among Soviet leaders concerning their future course in world affairs, as suggested by President Truman in his remarks at Kansas City on December 27, is another question. True, the impregnable monolithic character often attributed by Western commentators to the Russian Communist party is exaggerated, as indicated by the series of violent purges of Right and Left elements in the first twenty years of the Soviet system. Is it possible, however, to draw a sharp line of demarcation, as is now being done in Western countries, between the Soviet government and the Russian people? If the judgment of observers who have recently spent considerable time in the U.S.S.R. is to be trusted, Russians who differ with the Kremlin are not thinking in terms of replacing the Soviet system by one patterned on the United States or Britain, but of ridding it of some of its most ruthless controls and bureaucratic deficiencies—in short, of making the Soviet system work better and more humanely.

Dilemma of the West

Through the sensitized interaction between conflicting ideologies that make this globe "one world" more than is usually admitted on either side, the dilemma of the East is matched by a dilemma of the West. Our dilemma, too, has two major aspects. We face the problem of not allowing the hostility and resentment aroused by the Kremlin to distort our view of the rest of the world. And we have to find some way of making a serious study of Russian communism without, on the one hand, succumbing to its influence and, on the other, without coming to suspect each other thereby of "condoning" those Russian practices which have shocked the Western world.

The first aspect of our dilemma is perhaps the most difficult. Fear of Russia and of communism, and a desire to contain both in all parts of the world, cause the United States again and again to apply two weights and two measures in international affairs. Some of us, understandably sympathetic to our Western friends—Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands—justi-

fy their colonial policies, contending that the peoples of undeveloped areas like Indonesia cannot be expected to practice overnight self-government of the Western type. Is this true? If true, then it may be asked why for a quarter of a century we have expected, and still expect, that the peoples of Russia or China can achieve Anglo-American democracy in short order? If not true, then is it wise for the United States to support Western colonialism, thereby making Russia a gift of a powerful propaganda issue and alienating the peoples of Asia?

There is an incompatibility, too, in the attitude of the United States toward governments in Eastern Europe as contrasted with Latin America. In Eastern Europe Washington has urged free and unfettered elections and has denounced the establishment of dictatorial governments dominated by Communists. Yet at the Bogotá conference of 1948 the United States proposed recognition of governments in Latin America without inquiry into their character and without the requirement of prior elections. In the opinion of many observers, this doctrine has encouraged seizure of power by military juntas in Peru, Venezuela and El Salvador at the expense of the kind of middle-of-the-road regimes we have urged for Eastern Europe and the Balkans. When this incompatibility is discussed, the answer usually given is that in Europe, as contrasted with Latin America, United States policy is affected by the threat of the U.S.S.R. The question then arises, however, as to the extent to which American support or opposition in the case of any given government should be determined on the basis of principle, as compared with the effect it may have on our relations with the Kremlin.

Two Weights—Two Measures?

In the economic sphere we have been inclined to be automatically critical of all plans for modernization of agriculture and for industrialization developed in countries within the orbit of the U.S.S.R.—although some of us recognize the need for such development in India and Latin America. Is the demand for a higher standard of living that constitutes a common denominator between China and Argentina, between Indonesia and Yugoslavia, due solely to Communist propaganda and Russian needling—or is it inspired in the first instance, as was true in the case of Russia when it first started on its series of five-year plans, by a desire

to imitate the economic development of the United States which is held up throughout the world as the exemplar of material achievement? Are we always sufficiently aware of the responsibilities we have incurred by deploring the low living conditions of backward peoples, by urging them to become more prosperous, and consequently, we hope, more interested in political freedom? Have we perhaps been unduly slow to realize that the United States, to a far greater degree than economically backward Russia, has been the most potent revolutionary element in the twentieth century, affecting Russia itself? Will not the interests of the United States be better served in the long run if this country boldly accepts the leadership it has unconsciously assumed by its industrial proficiency, instead of allowing this leadership to fall into the hands of the U.S.S.R. by default?

Need for Critical Analysis

If we are to find effective answers to these and many other questions, it will not be enough to recapitulate the writings of Lenin and Stalin, any more than it was enough to recapitulate the writings of Hitler to understand the process of thought and action that brought the Nazis to power. What is needed is a critical and realistic analysis which would attempt to distinguish which of the aspects of what we call communism are due to the particular circumstances of Russia, and which to deep-seated and far-flung conditions existing in other countries—conditions that may call for long-term expansion of the economic and social alleviation measures imaginatively proposed by Secretary Marshall at Harvard in June 1947, but not as yet clearly integrated with other features of American foreign policy.

Such a restudy of Russia, of communism, of the role of the United States in a rapidly changing world, requires the most searching and untrammelled judgment on the part of political scientists of all shades of opinion. Yet the exercise of such judgment is menaced, at this particularly critical moment, by the tendency to believe that any attempt to understand ideologies different from our own is disloyal, and tantamount to "condoning" them. Should this tendency persist, free inquiry, rightly regarded as the hallmark of the West as compared with the U.S.S.R., may begin to suffer the kind of atrophy that is now deplored about

*Foreign Policy Bulletin, September 24, 1948.

Russia, and was only recently deplored about Germany. Obviously it is much safer for political scientists to "keep quiet," to avoid all risks by taking none. But might not the process of "keeping quiet" result in betrayal of intellectual freedom?

Western democracy, reinvigorated over and over again by the influx of new ideas, has proved capable of adjusting from the agrarianism of Jefferson's days to the highly developed industrialism of our century, from the aristocratic and imperial traditions of an earlier England, to

the socialism and reformed colonialism of the Labor party. It has nothing to fear from clear-headed examination of any and all ideas that may challenge it—and much to lose by following Russia's example of seeking to bar evaluation of other ideologies.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Ruhr Plan Reassures Paris—Irks Moscow and Germans

Mounting tension between France and the United States was eased with the publication on December 28 of a draft agreement for the establishment of an International Authority for the Ruhr, bringing to a close six-power negotiations which had been taking place in London since Armistice Day.* Serious French objections to the Anglo-American "Law No. 75," announced on November 10, which had provided for interim management of the Ruhr's coal, iron and steel industries by German trustees pending final determination of ownership by a freely elected German government, were to a large extent met by the terms of the new accord, providing for international control of the crucial industries which, the French think, might otherwise be used by the Germans as the arsenal for future aggression.

The Ruhr agreement—yet to be ratified by the signatories—does not meet all French wishes and has aroused strong protests from the Germans and the Russians. At the same time it represents an important modification of American policy which previously, against the advice of some in the State Department who had shared France's concern for the establishment of adequate security safeguards against a revival of German militarism, had been influenced by military leaders who viewed the Ruhr as a defense bastion and by economic experts who regarded it as the core of European recovery.

France's Protest

Concessions on the Ruhr, made to the French, reflect not only strong pressure from Paris, but also sentiment in Britain and in this country that something should be done to curb a resurgence of German nationalism, symptoms of which are already becoming discernible. The draft agreement goes beyond the terms of the six-power accord signed in London on June 1, 1948, which provided merely for

international control of the distribution of the Ruhr's coal, coke and steel (although this power is granted the new control authority in Article 14 through the establishment of minimum allocations for export).

When the French National Assembly voted acceptance of the London agreement on June 17, by the narrow margin of 300 to 286, it simultaneously demanded internationalization of the Ruhr's basic industries and expropriation of its former magnates. Subsequently French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman pressed this view on the British and American governments, intimating that if concessions were not made on this point, the Third Force government would be jeopardized and de Gaulle might come to power. French spokesmen expressed satisfaction with the concessions indicated in Secretary of State Marshall's statement on November 24, but continued to press for more definite commitments on permanent international control of the industries concerned.

On December 1 the French representative in London suggested that the proposed authority should: 1) prevent the revival of German industrial cartels; 2) keep Nazis and their potential supporters from positions of importance; and 3) control production so as to prevent excessive steel development and expand coal and coke production for general European use. The first two of these points has been provided for in Article 18 of the draft agreement which specifies that at the termination of the control period the powers now exercised by Military Government, necessary to achieve these objectives, shall be transferred to the International Authority, or the Military Security Board, or some other competent body.

With reference to the third point, however, the agreement is rather indefinite. It provides, in Article 19, that the powers of Military Government necessary to ensure that "production, development and investment . . . are in conformity with

the purposes stated in the preamble" shall be transferred to the Authority or the Security Board, or some other body. The preamble states that international security requires that the Ruhr's resources should be used for peaceful purposes and not for aggression, that access to them should be assured to countries "cooperating in the common good," and that there should be close association of economic life, lowering of economic barriers, and other steps to achieve these ends.

International Repercussions

Reactions in France to the draft agreement were favorable on the whole, with M. Schuman being given credit for a diplomatic triumph. Dissatisfaction was expressed, however, over failure to provide definite assurances on ultimate ownership of the Ruhr's industries as well as the related questions of proposed reductions in the plant dismantling program, and the proposed German constitution now being drafted at Bonn, which may go further in the direction of centralization than the French believe to be wise.

In the United States and Britain the press has welcomed the Ruhr agreement, but in Germany political leaders of all parties, from the Communist-led Socialist Unity party to the Christian Democrats, promptly attacked the plan. One German complaint was that the agreement would put their country in permanent bondage to the Allies. In answer, it has been pointed out that the communiqué accompanying the agreement specifically affirmed the intention of the six powers to make Germany a "full, responsible and independent" member of the European community. Moreover, Germany will be equally represented on the control council with Britain, France and the United States, each of which will have three votes, while the three Benelux countries are to have one vote apiece. Another German objection was that the Ruhr alone of industrial centers in Europe was being singled out for control.

*See *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, November 19, 1948.

Aside from the Allied view that this was a justified security measure, some have suggested that international controls should also be extended to other industrial areas. Thus André Philip, a leading French Socialist, told the French National Assembly on November 30 that an "inter-European public utility" should be established to control the international movement of coal and steel. Similar ideas have been expressed in Britain by journals ranging from the Leftist *New Statesman* to the moderately conservative *Economist*.

Russian objections were expressed in a Moscow broadcast on December 28 condemning the draft agreement as a triumph of American "reaction" and calling for four-power control as the only way to a "just solution" of the Ruhr problem. At the Moscow conference of April 1947 the United States had insisted that Russian participation in control of the Ruhr depended on agreement to submit all German industry to such management, including the coal and industrial resources of Silesia, now controlled by Poland. Washington officials are reported to have said that, if Moscow would cease its hostility to the West and consent to international control of the "little Ruhr" in Silesia, the draft agreement could easily be amended to include the Soviet Union.

Another line of Russian attack is suggested by a Prague news agency story to the effect that the London agreement is accompanied by a secret pact to permit the rearmament of Western Germany. Thus while the conclusion of the agreement has helped to reduce tension between some of the Western powers, it has created another issue in the controversy between Russia and the West over the peace settlement in Germany. Even between the Western countries, the agreement for control of the Ruhr's industries forms only part of a larger whole which, on the security side, involves specific guarantees against German resurgence, plans for Western Union and for European Federation, and on the economic side forms part of the intricate problem of European recovery in which the revival of German industry plays a key role.

FRED W. RIGGS

News in the Making

Those who have been disheartened by the inability of the UN Security Council to check fighting in Indonesia and Palestine found encouragement in the New Year's Day announcement that India and Pakistan had agreed to withdraw their troops from the disputed area of the state of Kashmir over which the two nations have been in conflict for fourteen months. Kashmir is to be divided into two zones, each with its own interim government, pending a plebiscite to be held under the supervision of a UN Commission. The population of Kashmir is chiefly Moslem, but its Hindu Maharajah acceded to India in October 1947. . . . From Warsaw on January 3 it was reported that *Britain and Poland* were about to sign a five-year pact for a \$600 million exchange of goods. Under this pact Poland will export eggs, bacon and timber to Britain, and receive in return machinery, wool and rubber. Polish food exports are expected to compensate for a considerable part of the order for Canadian foods recently canceled by Britain for lack of dollars. In a *Report* published April 1, 1948, the FPA had predicted that Poland, "once its agriculture has been rehabilitated and modernized, will be able to increase its food export as compared with prewar years even if the standard of internal consumption is raised considerably." . . . Israel's "Battle of the Negeb," according to on-the-spot observers, is designed primarily to force the Egyptian government, which invaded Palestine last summer, to open peace negotiations. Egypt finds itself in a grave dilemma: if it continues to fight, it is in danger of being severely defeated by Israel; if it decides to negotiate, its government may face a growing threat from Moslem extremists, as indicated by the assassination on December 28 of Premier Mahmoud Fahmy Nokrashy Pasha, victim of a young member of the fanatical Moslem Brotherhood which had been banned by the Premier on December 8. . . . *The French National Assembly*, overriding criticism in the advisory upper Council of the Republic, now dominated

Branch & Affiliate Meetings

MILWAUKEE, January 11, *The Middle East*, John S. Badeau

HARTFORD, January 13, *What to do About China*, Nathaniel Peffer

SPRINGFIELD, January 15, *The New German Nationalism—A Menace to France and the West*, William E. Griffith, Charlotte Muret

CLEVELAND, January 17, *World Cooperation—What are the Prospects for 1949?* An International Panel

New Appointment at FPA

Thomas L. Power joined the headquarters staff on January 3, 1949 to direct the national program. For twelve years Mr. Power was assistant to the director of Columbia University Extension. He served as National Director of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Entering the Army as a private, he was at the end of the war a Captain at General Eisenhower's GHQ in Frankfurt. For the past year and a half Mr. Power served as education director at International House in New York.

The Birth of Israel, by Jorge García-Granados. New York, Knopf, 1948. \$3.00

Dr. Granados, Guatemalan delegate to the UN who became a member of the Special Committee on Palestine, tells the story of his mission to that country, how the committee weighed evidence and made the report which culminated in the General Assembly's partition recommendation and the birth of the Jewish state.

Human Rights in the Modern World, by Arthur N. Holcombe. New York, New York University Press, 1948. \$3.75

A series of lectures by a professor of government at Harvard which deals with the efforts to draft an international bill of rights and also discusses the problems of enforcement. With scholarly objectivity Professor Holcombe considers the American and Western European heritage of human rights and the gulf between it and Soviet ideology. He concludes that in this field the UN should strive for limited objectives.

by de Gaulle's RPF, brought its 1948 session to a close on January 3. The budget for 1949, adopted in a last-minute rush, shows an anticipated balance, at least for ordinary expenditures. The necessary additional funds are to be obtained through indirect rather than direct taxation.

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